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Impeaching One's Own Witness
The doctrine that a party calling a witness may not discredit
such witness has generally been accepted in the United States, but
with a tendency to enlarge the possibilities of self-impeachment. It
is commonly believed to have its roots in the ancient idea of
trial by compurgation.' Other authorities place its probable origin
in the transition from the inquisitorial method of trial as it emerged
into an adversary system.2
Everyone agrees it is ordinarily the best practice, if it can be
effectively done, when a party shows that he has been surprised
by the adverse testimony of a witness he has offered, to permit him
to withdraw the witness and his testimony from the jury by having
the whole evidence stricken from the record.3 This course, if
effective, would protect the party who offered the witness without
complicating the issues or confusing the jury. It is doubtful if all
positive adverse effect which might be created by the harmful
testimony can be eliminated from the minds of the jury in this
manner.
4
Before a witness can be said to be that of the party calling
him, he must be sworn and some material question put to him and
answered by him.5 Where a witness testifies for both parties,
some courts hold impeachment of such witness by either party is
not allowable.0 Others say that such witness is the witness of each
party only to the extent of the testimony elicited by that party.7
These different views are also applied where a witness is cross-
examined beyond the scope of the direct examination."
Most jurisdictions adhere to the doctrine that, where it is
necessary to produce a witness because it is required by law,
such witness is not treated as being "one's own witness" and
is subject to impeachment, the same as a witness called by the
opposite party.9 This exception has been held to include an avail-
able witness to the crime; a witness who has testified before the
I Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 Pac. 1099 (1922); 3 WIGnrmO, EvDEMCE §
898 (3rd. ed. 1940).
2Ladd, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 4 UNv. CmcAGo L. R. 69.
3 Kuhn v. United States, 24 F. 2d 910 (9th Cir. 1928); 58 Am. Jur., Wit-
nesses § 79.
4 Young v. United States, 97 F. 2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938); 117 A. L. R. 316.
s Fall Brook Coal Co. v. Hewson, 158 N. Y. 1, 52 N. E. 1095 (1899).
6 Stix Baer and Fuller Co. v. Waesthaus Motor Co., 284 11M. App. 301, 1
N.E. 2d 796 (1936).
7 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses § 794.
8 State v. Wheaton, 149 Kan. 802, 89 P. 2d 871 (1939).
9 People v. Connor, 295 Mich. 1, 294 N. W. 74 (1940); White v. Southern
Oil Stores, 19 S. C. 173, 17 S. E. 2d 150 (1941).
364
COMMENTS
grand jury, and a subscribing witness to a will where a party is
under a legal duty or obligation to call such witness.'0
Except where a statute provides differently, a party called
as a witness by his adversary is held to be a witness within the
rule's prohibition." However, a goodly number of states have such
statutes, which provide relief from the strict application of the
rule to the party calling his adversary as a witness.
Where a party is fearful of an important witness he may per-
suade the court, by motion, to put this witness on the stand and in
such a case he is not treated as a witness for either side and is
subject to examination and cross-examination by both parties.' 2
Ib is held by an almost unanimous weight of authority that a
party producing a witness cannot impeach him as to character no
matter what the circumstances. 1 3 With a like unanimity the courts
exclude evidence of the bias, corruption, or interest of a witness
as being included within the prohibition of impeachment.
The biggest inroads on the strict rule have been made by the
exception which allows a party who called the witness to interrogate
him in respect to declarations and statements previously made
by him which are inconsistent with his testimony at the trial. This
exception is recognized in the great majority of jurisdictions.' 4 How-
ever, before this method of attacking one's own witness may be
utilized, the person seeking to impeach is usually required to show
that he is surprised,'1 or entral 'ed by the testimony of his witness,
or that the witness is hostile.16 The determination of the existence
of these conditions precedent is committed to the discretion of the
trial judge.17
Another limitation to this exception generally enforced by the
courts is that these prior inconsistent statements may not be used
as a device with which to put into evidence that which could be
held incompetent on another possible ground.' 8 Neither may a
party resort to examination of his witness as to prior statements
solely for the purpose of directly attacking his character or reputa-
10%leeks v. United States, 179 F. 2d 319 (9th Cir. 1950).
11 Price v. Cox, 242 Ala. 568, 7 So. 2d 888 (1942); Tullis v. Tullis, 235 Iowa
428, 16 1T. W. 2d 623 (1944).
12 Young v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 574 (W. D. Tex. 1939).
13 Weiner v. E. lII. Loew's Enterprises, 120 Conn. 581, 181 Ati. 921 (1936);
3 WIGxoRE, EvDmENcE § 900 (3rd ed. 1940).
14 Peope v. Reese, 65 Cal. App. 2d 329, 150 P. 2d 571 (1944); State v.
Rogers, 64 Ohio App. 39, 27 N.E. 2d 791 (1940).
15 United States v. Maggio, 126 F. 2d 155 (3rd Cir. 1942); Young v. United
States, 97 F. 2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938); 117 A. L. R. 316.
16 Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Hall, 184 Va. 102, 34 S. E. 2d 382 (1945).
17 !biCL
Is United States v. Mlichener, 152 F. 2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1946); State v. Nevius,
77 Ohio App. 161, 66 N.E. 2d 24.3 (1945).
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tion for truth and veracity.19 This examination is permitted only
for the purpose of refreshing the recollection of the witness20 or for
the purpose of discrediting or neutralizing the adverse effect of
his specific testimony. 21 That the witness is incidentally discredited
by this process is regarded by the courts as of no great moment. 22
By the weight of authority, one's own witness may be impeached
by the use of prior inconsistent statements only where the witness
testiied adversely on some material point, and then impeachment
is confined to the subject matter of the adverse statement.23 One
may not impeach his own witness merely because the witness does
not come up to his expectations or prove the fact for which he
was called.2 4
Interrogation concerning prior inconsistent statements is re-
stricted by some courts to the particular witness.25 These courts
hold that in case the witness denies having made such statements
or his answer is ambiguous concerning them, it is not competent
for the party calling him to prove by other witnesses that he had
made statements inconsistent therewith. Other courts, however,
permit extrinsic evidence to prove such prior inconsistent state-
ments.26 Some courts have approved still another restriction
which excludes proof of statements not in any writing subscribed by
the witness or made under oath.27
It is a well established qualification of the rule against
self-impeachment, followed in all jurisdictions, that a party is
not concluded by the unfavorable testimony of his own witness.
Although a party may not impeach the general reputation of a
witness for truth or veracity, he may by other witnesses prove
that the facts are otherwise than as stated, and it is no objection
to any relevant evidence of material facts on which he relies to
sustain his case, that it may operate to contradict and thus discredit
his own witness.
Attempted statutory modification of the rule may be divided
into two general classes, those following the English statute enacted
in 1854,28 and those following the Massachusetts version enacted in
1869.29
19United States v. Maggio, 126 F. 2d 155 (3rd Cir. 1942).
20Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303 (1893).
21 State v. D'Adame, 84 N. J. L. 386, 86 Atl. 414 (1913).
22 State v. Duffy, 134 Ohio St. 16, 15 N. E. 2d 535 (1938).
23 State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N. W. 898 (1939).
24 Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 184 Virginia 102, 34 S. E. 2d 382 (1945).
2S Hurley v. State, 46 Ohio St. 320, 21 N. E. 645 (1889).
26 Batchelder v. Batchelder, 139 Mass. 1, 29 N. E. 61 (1891).
27 Hurley v. State, 46 Ohio St. 320, 21 N. E. 645 (1889).
26 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, § 22 (1854).
29 Ann. Laws of Mass. vol. 8 c. 233, § 22 (1869); P.S. 169, § 22; R. L. 175
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The English statute provides, "(1) A party producing a witness
shall not be allowed to impeach his credit by general evidence
of bad character, (2) but he may, in case the witness shall in the
opinion of the judge prove adverse, (3) contradict him by other
evidence, (4) or by leave of the judge prove that he has made at
other times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony."
Florida, New Mexico, Vermont and Virginia have incorporated
substantially the same provisions in statutes of their own.30 It is
readily apparent that this type of statute is only a codification of the
case law concerning the rule and decisions of the courts in these
jurisdictions have clearly affirmed this interpretation.
The Massachusetts statute differs from the English statute in
not including the requirement that the witness prove adverse and
has been adopted by eleven states.3, Judicial interpretation has
resulted in a rule not different from that of the modem common
law rule.32 In Massachusetts the courts have taken a very liberal
approach requiring neither adversity or surprise as a condition to
impeaching one's own witness.33 Indiana has further liberalized the
Massachusetts statute by providing that a witness may be impeached
by evidence of bad character, where it is indispensable that a party
produce a witness, or in case of manifest surprise.3 4 In Beneks v.
State35 the court said, "Under this section the only requirement as a
prerequisite to impeachment of a witness is that he testified to facts
prejudicial to the party producing him upon some material issue."
New York has added the restriction that only prior inconsistent
statements that were written or were made under oath by one's
own witness may be used to impeach him. °
Louisiana has enacted the common law rule in statutory form;
it differs from the English statute in adding surprise as a basis
of impeachment and because of its detailed provisions clearly
precludes a liberal interpretation.3 7 Georgia has by statute made
the showing of surprise a condition precedent to impeachment by
prior inconsistent statements.3 " In the District of Columbia there
30FIA. Coup. GN. L. § 4377 (1927); N. M. ANN. STATS., c. 45 § 607; VT.
PUB. L. § 1702 (1933); VA. CODE § 62.5 (1930).
31 Aiu. DiG. § 4186 (1921); CAL CODE Civ. PROC. § 2049 (1931); IDAHO CODE
16 § 1207 (1932); Bums IND. STATS. c. 2, § 1926 (1933); CARRou's Ky. CODE §
596 (1921); OR. CODE c. 9, § 3909 (1930); TEXAS CODE of Cam. PRoc. § 732
(1928); Wyo. REv. STAT. c. 89 § 1706 (1931); N.Y. CODE CR. PROC. § 8a.
32 Ralph Estate, 192 Cal. 451, 221 Pac. 361 (1924).
33 Brooks v. Weeks, 121 Mass. 433 (1876).
34 BURNs IND. STATS. c. 2, § 1926 (1933).
3S Beneks v. State, 208 InLd. 317, 196 N.E. 73 (1935).
36N. Y. CODE CR. PROC. § 8a; People v. Romano, 279 N.Y. 392, 18 N.E.
2d 634 (1939).
3 7 LA. CODE CR. Poc. §§ 487, 488, 489 (1932).
33 GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1801.
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is a statute permitbing a party to impeach his own witness by proof
of prior inconsistent statements in event of surprise with the in-
cluded proviso that if the statements are made to a party or his
attorney before trial the requisite element is met.3 9
A very common type of statute provides that a party calling his
adversary as a witness may impeach him in the same manner
as any other witness not his own.40 These statutes generally ex-
pressly include impeachment of officers and agents of a corporation
where the corporation is the adverse party.
The MODEL CODE OF EviDENCE as adopted and promulgated by
the American Law Institute at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 15,
1942, eliminates the rule against impeaching one's own witness.4 1
Impeachment is permitted under the code by any party, including
the party calling a witness, through examination, as to any conduct
and any other matter relevant upon the issue of his credibility as a
witness.
The rule against impeaching one's own witness is generally
justified on the theory that a party calling a witness vouches for
his credibility and represents him as worthy of belief and it would
be bad faith towards the court thereafter to attack his witness.4 2
The answering argument is that a party generally has no choice in
the selection of his witnesses. Thus to hold a party responsibile for
the character and trustworthiness of the witnesses called by him
is to disregard practicabilities. 43
Another reason given to support the rule is that the party
should not have the means of coercing his witness.4 4 In other words,
no witness would risk the abuse of his character which might be
launched against him. This fear it is claimed would operate to
prevent a witness from retracting a previously falsified story and
would affect every witness who knew he was expected to tell a
particular story. It is argued by the critics that an honest witness
would not be appreciably affected but that only a disreputable
witness would adhere to false testimony solely for fear of exposure
by the party calling him.4 5 The fear theory also does not take ac-
count of the fact that the reputation of a witness may be used against
him by the other party. To approve this reason for the rule one
must also hold the belief that most lawyers are dishonest and
39 D. C. CODE tit 9 § 21 (1929).40 OIO GErT. CODE § 11497; ILL. Crrv PR~cncE AcT § 60.
41 MODEL CODE OF EviDENCE, Rule 106 (1942); See Professor Ladd's Article
p. 341.
42 3 WiGmoRE EViDENcE §§ 896-918 inc. (3rd Ed. 1940).
43 State v. Wolfe, 109 W. Va. 590, 156 S. E. 56 (1931).
44 Ladd, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 4 UNv. CHICAGO L. R. 69.
4 5 Buller J., Trials at Nisi Prius 297 (1767); State v. Wolfe, 109 W. Va. 590,
156 S. E. 56 (1931).
[Vol. 11
COMMENTS
would take advantage of such fear to suborn a witness. It would
seem that fear of prosecution for perjury would operate to counter-
act fear of such unethical impeachment. Another assumption indis-
pensable to this reason is that all witnesses within the rule who
testify adversely at trial are testifying truthfully and repudiating a
previous falsity.46 Professor Ladd points out the fallacy of this
assumption by considering the influence other than the inclination
to tell the truth which causes a witness to change his mind e.g.,
sympathy for the accused in criminal trials, bribery and threats
of physical hairm.
The decisions illustrate that the judiciary is dissatisfied with the
common law rule inasmuch as one exception or qualification after
another has been adopted which circumscribes the limits of the
rule. Neither does the lawyer approve the difficulties and confusion
which the enforcement of the rule creates. The text writers con-
clude that the rule against impeaching one's own witness should
be completely done away with by statute.47
That there is no concentrated effort to eliminate the rule
against impeaching one's own witness can be explained. If one
considers the rule with all of its ramifications and exceptions, the
conclusion is inevitable that one may impeach his own witness.
It must be admitted that pitfalls abound and the impeacher must
carefully adhere to a circuitous path to accomplish his goal. Even
impeaching the character or reputation of a witness is condoned
if it is done incidentally and not directly. Still, confusion for the
judge, lawyer, and jury who must deal with the rule against the
impeaching of one's own witness remains. This confusion occasion-
ally results in a miscarriage of justice which could be avoided.
Can a rule founded on no valid reason, not enforced in reality and
resulting in avoidable injustices be condoned any longer? It must be
concluded that the rule must be completely abrogated and in the
words of Professor Ladd, "A .... simple form of legislation, which
would dispose of the entire problem is suggested as follows: No
party shall be precluded from impeaching a witness because the
witness is his own."'48  Donald H. Hauser
46 Ladd, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 4 Um-v. CHICAGO L. R. 69; 3 WiG-
mior, EvDEicE §§ 896-918 inc. (3rd Ed. 1940).
47 See note 46 supra.
43 See note 46 supra.
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